There's a question that many people ask themselves without always daring to formulate it clearly. When world leaders meet at summits, when communiqués are published and handshakes photographed, does anything really change? Do these institutions really steer the global economy, or does reality play out elsewhere, in less visible offices, according to less avowed logic?
The answer is uncomfortable. But it's also exciting.
Three acronyms, three world projects
The G7, the G20 and the BRICS are not simply three groups of countries that meet regularly. They are three competing visions of what the world economic order should be, and the tension between them structures much of contemporary geopolitics.
The G7 is the oldest of the three. Created in 1975 in the wake of the first oil crisis, it brings together the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, Japan and Canada, plus the European Union as a permanent guest. When they were created, these seven economies accounted for most of the world's wealth. Their legitimacy to coordinate the world economy seemed obvious at the time.
The G20 emerged in 1999, initially as a forum for finance ministers, before becoming a summit of heads of state in 2008 under the pressure of the global financial crisis. It includes the G7 economies as well as China, India, Brazil, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Turkey and others. Its creation was an implicit recognition that the G7 could no longer claim to govern a profoundly transformed global economy on its own.
The BRICS, The BRICS+ group is an acronym coined in 2001 by Goldman Sachs economist Jim O'Neill to designate the emerging economies with the greatest potential: Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. Since 2024, the group has expanded to include Iran, the United Arab Emirates, Ethiopia and Egypt, among others, becoming BRICS+. It's no longer a financial concept. It's a political project.
World economy: the real weight of the figures
When you compare the weight of these groups in the global economy, the figures tell a story that institutions prefer not to emphasise too much.
The G7 still accounts for around 43% of world GDP in nominal terms, according to International Monetary Fund data for 2025. This is considerable. But this figure has been falling steadily for twenty years. In terms of purchasing power parity, a measure that corrects for exchange rate distortions and better reflects the productive reality of the economies, the BRICS+ now outstrip the G7. China alone accounts for around 19% of world GDP in purchasing power parity, ahead of the United States.
The G20 covers around 85% of global GDP, 75% of international trade and two-thirds of the world's population. On paper, it is the most representative forum. In practice, its very diversity is its main weakness. Getting Washington and Beijing, Berlin and Moscow, Riyadh and New Delhi to coexist in the same room around a joint communiqué requires compromises that often strip the texts of their substance.
What the G7 can still do and what it can no longer do
The G7 still has a real influence on the world economy, but it is increasingly focused on specific areas. The coordination of economic sanctions is the most striking example. The Western response to the invasion of Ukraine in 2022 demonstrated that the G7 could still act as a coherent bloc capable of mobilising massive economic tools at short notice.
The setting of a minimum global tax rate on multinationals at 15%, negotiated within the OECD but supported politically by the G7, is another example of the capacity for real action on structural issues in the global economy.
But the G7 can no longer claim to represent the world. When it takes decisions that affect the entire global economy without consulting two-thirds of the world's population, its legitimacy is called into question. And this questioning is no longer just rhetorical. It is reflected in concrete behaviour: refusal to align with sanctions, creation of alternative financial circuits, acceleration of de-dollarisation in certain bilateral trade.
World economy: de-dollarisation, a weak signal or a structural break?
It is one of the most debated and misunderstood topics in the world economy today. De-dollarisation refers to the process by which some countries seek to reduce their dependence on the US dollar for trade and foreign exchange reserves.
This process is real. It is documented by data from the Bank for International Settlements, which shows a slight but steady decline in the dollar's share of global reserves, from around 71 per cent in 2000 to around 58 per cent in 2024. The oil trade between China and Saudi Arabia partially denominated in yuan, the bilateral agreements between BRICS+ countries in local currencies, and the discussions on a common currency for the BRICS are all signals of a political will to reduce the hegemony of the dollar.
But let's be clear. The dollar remains by far the dominant reserve currency. The yuan has neither the convertibility, nor the depth of financial markets, nor the institutional credibility to replace it in the short term. What you are seeing is not the end of the dollar. It is the beginning of a world that is less monetarily unipolar.
BRICS+: real power or a cosmetic coalition?
The BRICS+ suffer from a fundamental contradiction that their communiqués do not resolve. They share a common aspiration for a world order less dominated by the West. But their concrete economic interests diverge profoundly.
China is a net exporter and benefits from an open trading system. India protects its domestic market and is wary of Chinese economic domination. Brazil is an exporter of raw materials whose interests change according to price cycles. Russia is under sanctions and is looking to the BRICS+ for a way around as much as an alliance. South Africa represents an entire continent whose development needs are out of all proportion to those of the founding members.
This heterogeneity structurally limits the ability of the BRICS+ to become a coherent institution of global economic governance. They can influence negotiations, create partial alternatives to the Bretton Woods institutions such as the New Development Bank, and influence diplomatic agendas. But will they replace the IMF, the WTO or the G20? Not in the foreseeable future.
World economy: who really decides?
If you are looking for a simple answer to the question of who is really driving the global economy, you will be disappointed. The honest answer is that nobody really does. What you are witnessing is an ongoing negotiation between powers whose interests overlap to some extent and diverge fundamentally.
The United States remains the most powerful player, thanks to its dollar, its financial markets, its military capability and its technological dominance. China is the second most important player, thanks to its industrial, commercial and demographic weight. Between them, Europe, Japan, India and the Gulf States play a balancing role, with varying degrees of leeway depending on the issue and the moment.
The G20 is the arena where these powers negotiate. The G7 is the Western hard core that tries to maintain a coherent bloc. The BRICS+ are the counter-project that seeks to broaden the negotiating space. None of the three governs the world economy alone. Together, they produce something that looks less like steering than a permanent management of disagreement.
Important anchors for further study
To find out more about these subjects, here are some themes to explore: IMF world economic outlook report, Bank for International Settlements de-dollarisation, New BRICS Development Bank financing, OECD global minimum tax agreement 15 per cent, G20 history and economic governance, purchasing power parity GDP international comparison, Jim O'Neill Goldman Sachs BRICS origin, and fragmentation global economy World Bank report.
Next time you read a G7 or BRICS summit communiqué, read it twice. Once for what it says. Once for what it doesn't say. It is often in the space between the two that the global economy is really played out.
